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LONE-PARENT INCOMES AND WORK INCENTIVES 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines how changes to the social welfare system for lone parents, 
such as the tightening of eligibility criteria for One-Parent Family Payment and the 
introduction of Jobseeker’s Transitional Payment, affected lone-parent incomes 
and work incentives. Our main contributions are threefold: we examine the 
cumulative effect of policy changes on the income of lone parents, and how 
changes to lone-parent-specific schemes affected income and work incentives, and 
quantify the extent to which childcare costs act as a labour market barrier for lone 
parents.  
Firstly, policy changes do not occur in a vacuum, therefore we assess how all policy 
from 2011 to 2018 affected lone-parent income. We find that changes to social 
welfare policy for lone parents resulted in income losses for employed lone 
parents, but had little effect on non-employed lone parents. All other changes over 
the period decreased the income of both employed and non-employed lone 
parents. We examine how these social welfare changes affected the work 
incentives. The reforms resulted in more lone parents having a greater financial 
incentive to be out of work, thus weakening the financial incentive to be in work.  
Finally, informed by an abundant literature regarding childcare costs as an obstacle 
to female labour supply, we highlight the impact of these costs on the incentive to 
be in work. We find that on accounting for childcare costs, being out of work 
becomes much more financially attractive for many lone parents. The availability 
of subsidies on childcare costs helps to reduce this disincentive, but even so, 
childcare costs represent a substantial barrier to lone-parent labour market 
participation. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The One-Parent Family Payment (OPFP) has offered income support to lone-parent 
families since its introduction in 1997.1 The payment differs from Jobseeker’s 
Allowance in that it is not contingent on seeking employment or engaging in 
activation measures. Between 2012 and 2015 a raft of changes were implemented, 
mainly surrounding eligibility for the payment. Prior to the recent changes, lone 
parents were eligible to receive the payment until their youngest child turned 18, 
or 22 if the child remained in education. By 2015 this age limit had dropped to 7.  
 
                                                          
 
1  Prior to this, supports for lone parents included the Lone Parent Allowance and the Unmarried Mother’s Allowance. 
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These changes were enacted in large part due to research at national and 
international levels showing relatively low employment rates of lone parents, high 
benefit receipt rates and high poverty and deprivation rates.2 Research suggests 
that long-term payments that are not conditional on job-search or other 
participation commitments, such as OPFP, could lead to welfare dependency and 
an increase in the pervasiveness of poverty among recipients.3 A significant aim of 
these changes, therefore, was to increase activation and encourage parents to 
return to the labour market as their children become older. The changes have led 
to more variability in a lone parent’s income source over time as different social 
welfare schemes can be availed of as their youngest child grows older.  
This paper aims firstly to assess the impact of these OPFP changes on the 
disposable income of lone parents. As pointed out by Indecon (2017) in its review 
of the changes to the OPFP, average incomes of lone parents over time are an 
amalgamation of the direct impact that changes to the OPFP had on the income 
and employment rates of lone parents and any other changes over the time period 
analysed that may have affected lone parents regardless of changes to the OPFP.4 
That report pointed to the importance of assessing outcomes compared to a 
counterfactual, i.e. what would have happened in the absence of the policy 
change. Simply looking at the employment rates and incomes of current lone 
parents and comparing these to the population of lone parents prior to the changes 
could therefore give misleading and hard-to-interpret results.  
Using microsimulation techniques, this paper will isolate the effects of the OPFP 
policy reforms on the income of the current population of lone parents. This 
method abstracts away from any behavioural impacts of changes to the payment. 
As noted above, changes to the OPFP could have had an impact on the incentives 
to work. Analysis of individual cases will fail to give a clear understanding of the 
overall context of the landscape for all lone parents. Again, using microsimulation 
techniques on a representative sample of the population will allow us to profile the 
current labour market incentives faced by the population of lone parents, rather 
than actual or hypothetical cases, which may not be representative.  
Furthermore, most analyses of financial incentives to work compare in-work and 
out-of-work incomes. Given relatively high childcare costs in Ireland and the fact 
that lone parents are the sole potential earner and carer in the family, we examine 
the current incentives to work faced by lone parents taking account of childcare 
costs and the recently introduced Affordable Childcare Scheme (ACS) subsidies. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 profiles the income and 
employment situation of lone parents and outlines the Irish policy changes 
 
                                                          
 
2  For example, see OECD (2003) and Department of Social and Family Affairs (2006). 
3  See OECD (2005, 2006). 
4  For example, over the period we analyse, 2011–2018, the economy was recovering; increases in employment rates or 
incomes of lone parents may in part be due to this recovery. 
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examined. Section 3 discusses the methodology used, and Section 4 presents the 
results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2 LONE-PARENT EMPLOYMENT RATES, INCOMES AND POLICIES  
2.1 International comparison 
Ireland does not seem to be an outlier in terms of the scale of lone parenthood. 
OECD (2016a) shows that 17.6 per cent of Irish children live with a single parent, 
only slightly above the OECD and EU averages of 17.1 per cent and 16.7 per cent. 
Our nearest neighbour, the United Kingdom, had 23.2 per cent of children living 
with a single parent; the corresponding figure for the United States was a relatively 
high 27.4 per cent.  
However, Ireland does stand out in terms of poverty and deprivation experienced 
by these lone parents. Lone parents and their children are particularly prone to 
experiencing deprivation5 and poverty6 across the EU, with lone parents in Ireland 
having a more heightened risk. Watson et al. (2018) exploit the longitudinal 
component of EU–SILC data across six waves of the survey: 2005 and 2006, 2008 
and 2009, and 2013 and 2014. They isolate individuals in each wave of the survey 
in adjacent years. Using this method they found that over these years, in 11 
countries,7 an average of 43 per cent of lone parents experienced deprivation in 
either of the years they were observed in SILC. A fairly similar proportion, 38 per 
cent, were at risk of poverty in either wave. 
In Ireland, persistent poverty, defined as being at risk of poverty in both survey 
years, was particularly pronounced among lone parents. Persistent poverty was 26 
percentage points higher among lone parents than for other adults, compared to 
an average gap of between 5 and 20 percentage points evident in other countries 
examined. Due to the time frame of the study, this indicates that poverty among 
lone parents in Ireland appears to be more endemic and not solely due to transient 
shocks such as a short-term loss of employment. 
These results for lone parents are not surprising given their position in the income 
distribution. In Table 1 we show the distribution of lone-parent households8 across 
the income distribution before and after social transfers. Averages for the ‘boom 
years’ of 2004 to 2007, the Great Recession from 2008 to 2012 and subsequent 
recovery from 2013 to 2015 are displayed. Before considering social transfers9 to 
the working age population, in all time periods a large proportion of lone-parent 
 
                                                          
 
5  As measured by the inability to afford three or more of the following: annual holiday; meeting unexpected expenses; 
avoiding arrears on household bills; a protein meal every second day; adequate heating of the dwelling; durable goods 
like a washing machine, colour television, telephone or car. 
6  Income poverty as measured by the proportion living in a household with annual, equivalised income below 60 per 
cent of the median income. 
7  Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Greece and Ireland. 
8  Households with only one adult where children (aged under 18) are present. 
9  I.e. taking only earned income such as that from employment into account. 
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households are located in the bottom two household income deciles: 70 per cent 
in 2004 to 2007, 61 per cent in 2008 to 2012 and 56 per cent in 2013 to 2015.  
Once social welfare transfers are taken into account, the concentration of lone-
parent households in the bottom two income deciles has been relatively consistent 
over time – 43 per cent in 2004 to 2007, 40 per cent in 2008 to 2012 and 39 per 
cent in 2013 to 2015. In general, a slight improvement of the post-transfer income 
situation of lone parents can be seen, with a movement from decile 1 up to decile 
2. In comparison to other households with children, 16 per cent of households 
comprising two adults and one child were in the bottom two deciles before social 
transfers in the most recent time period (2013–15), falling to 12 per cent once 
social transfers have been taken into account. 
Once social transfers are taken into account, lone-parent households experience a 
much larger relative improvement in their position in the income distribution than 
other household types. They continue to be more likely to be in the bottom two 
deciles than other one-earner households, however.10 This indicates that for lone-
parent households, the social welfare system has a substantial role to play in 
improving their position in the income distribution, but even so, a large portion of 
them remain in the bottom half of the income distribution.  
TABLE 1 DISTRIBUTION OF LONE-PARENT HOUSEHOLDS ALONG INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
  
Before working age transfers (%) After all transfers (%) 
Decile 
Average 
2004–2007 
Average 
2008–2012 
Average 
2013–2015 
Average 
2004–2007 
Average 
2008–2012 
Average 
2013–2015 
Lowest 46 35 33 29 17 19 
2 24 26 23 14 23 20 
3 8 14 16 13 11 13 
4 6 8 8 14 11 14 
5 4 3 4 15 15 12 
6 4 4 3 6 10 9 
7 2 3 4 2 5 5 
8 2 2 4 2 3 4 
9 2 2 3 2 2 3 
Highest 1 2 2 1 2 2 
Household 
type 
Real mean incomes (equivalised, disposable) 
Lone parent  €7,329 €8,161 €8,755 €15,610 €18,681 €18,095 
Couple with 
children 
€22,431 €21,870 €22,474 €25,772 €27,089 €27,371 
Overall 
population 
€22,184 €23,583 €23,974 €25,189 €26,954 €27,809 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis using SILC Research Microdata Files. 
Note:   Deciles are based on household equivalised disposable income. Incomes are expressed in 2015 constant prices.  
 
                                                          
 
10   Over the same time period, 28 per cent of one adult households were located in the bottom two deciles after social 
transfers. 
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A comparison of the median incomes of lone parents compared to the overall 
population and to couple-headed families shows that before transfers the median 
income of lone parents in the 2013–2015 time period was only slightly more than 
one third of that of the overall population. Again the transfer system reduces this 
gap sharply, but lone-parent incomes after transfers remain at two thirds of those 
of the overall population and couple-headed households with children. 
This position of lone parents in the income distribution is linked to labour market 
patterns. Here we focus on females, given that in 2016 86 per cent of lone parents 
(Census 2016) and 99 per cent of OPFP recipients (Department of Employment 
Affairs and Social Protection, 2016) were female.  
Figure 1 compares the employment rates of single mothers and partnered 
mothers. Across the OECD an average of 67 per cent of partnered mothers were 
employed, with only a slightly lower rate of 65 per cent for single mothers. Similar 
employment levels are seen across the EU, with 69 per cent of partnered mothers 
and 64 per cent of single mothers in employment. The employment rate of 
partnered mothers in Ireland stood at 63 per cent, 4/6 percentage points below 
the OECD/EU average. For single mothers, however, the employment rate was 
significantly below this, standing at 46 per cent, 13 percentage points below that 
in the UK and 19 percentage points below the OECD average.  
 
FIGURE 1 EMPLOYMENT RATES OF SINGLE AND PARTNERED MOTHERS 
 
Source:  OECD (2014). 
 
In addition to the fact that the employment rate of single mothers is almost one 
third lower than the OECD average, when they are in employment single mothers 
in Ireland are much more likely to be in part-time employment, and therefore likely 
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to earn less. 52 per cent of lone parents in employment in Ireland work below 30 
hours a week compared to only 21 per cent across the OECD (OECD, 2014). 
Overall, it seems that the employment levels and work hours of Irish lone parents 
are outliers in a European and OECD country context. Employment rates are low 
and those who are in employment are more likely to work part-time and face a 
higher risk of being in persistent poverty. Were it not for social welfare transfers, 
over half of lone-parent households would be in the bottom two deciles of the 
income distribution. This is no surprise, however, given the low employment rate 
and high rate of part-time employment observed for single mothers.  
In light of low employment rates and high at-risk-of-poverty and deprivation rates 
among lone parents, moves towards increasing lone-parent employment rates, as 
envisaged by the OPFP policy changes, are likely to improve the position of lone 
parents in the income distribution if they prove to be effective. Two key issues 
must be borne in mind in assessing the effectiveness of the policy changes in 
meeting their aims.  
Firstly, childcare costs in Ireland are among the highest across the OECD.11 Evans 
et al. (2003)12 point to the fact that effective activation policies are costly and may 
require a shift, rather than a reduction, in welfare expenditure, in the short term 
at least, as income from work may not be sufficient to provide adequate income 
once childcare costs are taken into account so that many may become working 
poor. Indecon (2017) found some initial evidence of a rise in labour market 
participation and labour market earnings among those who lost OPFP between 
2013 and 2016,13 noting a 3 to 4 per cent reduction in benefit receipt.14 The average 
total income of those remaining on OPFP was €18,071 – only marginally below the 
average of €18,720 for those who lost the payment. These figures do not, however, 
take account of the childcare costs that lone parents returning to work or 
increasing work hours are likely to have faced. 
Secondly, wage rates and work hours will impact upon the total level of earnings 
from employment for those entering the labour market or increasing their work 
hours. If employment is concentrated in low-paid sectors or/and is on a part-time 
basis, the positive impact of employment on poverty and deprivation will be 
reduced. Indecon (2017) found that the numbers of lone parents in full-time 
employment rose from 15% while on OPFP to 22 per cent when OPFP receipt 
finished. 60 per cent remained in part-time employment, however – only slightly 
down from 66 per cent while on OPFP. 
 
                                                          
 
11  OECD (2016b) shows that a lone parent on two thirds of the average wage faces childcare costs that are 42 per cent of 
net income, the second highest level across the OECD. 
12  Summarised in Millar and Crosse (2016). 
13  Of those who remained on OPFP between 2013 and 2016, 44 per cent had earnings form employment in 2016 
compared to 60 per cent of those who lost OPFP. Average earnings of those remaining on OPFP were €4,248, compared 
to €7,576 on losing OPFP. 
14  Based on Indecon’s (2017) ‘difference in difference/regression discontinuity design’ results. 
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Across the OECD a mix of policies regarding lone parents exist, with some countries 
having no specific welfare benefit aimed at lone parents, and in countries where 
such a specific benefit exists requirements to seek work or engage in activation 
measures differ. As discussed in Millar and Crosse (2016), Rowlingson and Millar 
(2002) identify three main types of policies to support lone parents’ movement 
into the workforce: 
• the introduction of strict work requirements or participation in activation 
programmes; 
• changes to welfare payments and taxes to improve the financial incentive to 
work; 
• the provision of childcare services or subsidies. 
As well as aiming to reduce poverty and deprivation among lone parents, an 
economic rationale exists to provide a larger financial incentive to work for lone 
parents. One way to do this, as is done under the OPFP, is to provide an earnings 
disregard. In a study of 17 European countries and the US, Bargain et al. (2014) 
found that single mothers tend to have larger labour supply elasticities than 
childless women. In many countries, differences are usually not significant, but 
notable exceptions included Ireland and Greece. This means that the lone mothers 
in Ireland react more strongly in terms of their hours worked as the income they 
earn changes. Therefore, if no earnings disregard is in place, or if it is reduced, a 
mother’s marginal effective tax rate (METR) may be quite high as the benefit is 
withdrawn as soon as employment income is received. Anything that increases this 
METR, such as a drop in the earnings disregard, is more likely to result in a 
reduction in work hours.  
2.2 Irish policy changes 
In 2011, lone parents could receive the OPFP until their child was 18 years old, or 
22 if their child remained in education. The personal rate payment was €188, with 
a €29.80 increase for a qualified child. An earnings disregard of €146.50 was in 
place, meaning that this amount of earned income was excluded from the 
calculation of means. A lone parent was therefore eligible for a full payment of 
OPFP if their earned income was less than €146.50 per week, and between €146.50 
and €425 per week the payment was incrementally reduced to zero. 
Various OECD reports (see OECD 2003, 2011) were critical of the lack of an 
activation requirement for those in receipt of OPFP, under the belief that it was 
contributing to the low employment rates seen among lone parents. OECD (2003) 
noted that ‘the long periods of leave that lone parents can spend on benefit result 
in some children growing up in poor, workless and even socially excluded 
conditions’. A report by the then Department of Social and Family Affairs (2006) 
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discusses the fact that earlier schemes15 were structured around the assumption 
that women should not work and should remain in the home full-time. Indeed, the 
introduction of the OPFP with its earnings disregard was a step in the process of 
moving away from this assumption. The report acknowledged the need to move 
away from supports that ‘have to date been passive in nature, with no active or 
systematic supports in assisting the person to take up education, training or 
employment opportunities’ and, in reference to the fact that OPFP can be received 
until a child is 18 (or 22 if in education), that ‘long term welfare dependency is not 
in the best interests of the lone parent, their children or society in general’. 
As part of the conditions under the Troika financial assistance programme (or 
‘bailout’), it was agreed to introduce activation as a requirement for lone parents. 
The Social Welfare and Pensions Act, 2012, brought about significant changes to 
the OPFP scheme, for both existing recipients and future applicants. For those who 
were in receipt of OPFP in 2012 there was a phased withdrawal of OPFP each year 
once the parent’s youngest child reached a certain age, as shown in Table 2. By July 
2015 the changes were fully implemented so that only lone parents whose 
youngest child was under seven would be eligible for the OPFP. 
 
TABLE 2 TIGHTENING OF AGE LIMITS FOR OPFP AFTER REFORMS 
 
  Terminal payment age 
OPFP payment commencement 2012 July 2013 July 2014 July 2015 
Before 27 April 2011 18 17 16 7 
Between 27 April 2011 and 3 May 2012 14 12 10  
After 3 May 2012 12 10 7  
     
Source: Joint Committee on Social Protection (2017). 
 
A complementary welfare payment, Jobseeker’s Transition Payment (JST), was 
introduced to support lone parents transitioning into the labour market, whose 
youngest child was aged between 7 and 13 years. The scheme was very similar to 
OPFP except that a labour market activation component was introduced. A lone 
parent has no obligation to actively seek employment under the scheme but 
recipients of JST are obliged to meet with one of the Department of Employment 
Affairs and Social Protection’s (DEASP) case officers to facilitate the individual’s 
movement towards labour market participation by identifying employment 
schemes, educational options and other training which may augment their 
employment transition. Failure to engage in this process may result in a reduced 
rate of JST payment. 
The Back to Work Family Dividend (BTWFD) was also introduced in 2015. This policy 
 
                                                          
 
15  Such as the ‘Unmarried Mother’s Allowance’. 
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was aimed at improving the work incentives of families who enter paid 
employment. For lone parents this meant that when entering paid employment, 
they could retain the top-up payment for having a dependent child availed of in 
the OPFP or jobseeker’s scheme for the first year of employment. In the second 
year, half the top-up payment was retained. This amounted to an additional €1,550 
per qualified child in the first year and €775 in the second year. 
By 2018, the year of our analysis, the OPFP maximum personal rate stood at €198 
per week with an increase of €31.80 per qualified child and an earnings disregard 
of €130 per week. The benefit is fully withdrawn if means exceed €425 per week. 
The same rates and earnings disregard are in place under the JST payment. 
Notably, between 2011 and 2018 there was an increase in the personal rate (€188 
to €198) and qualified child allowance (€29.80 to €31.80) but a decrease in the 
earnings disregard (€146.50 to €130). This means that a lone parent can now earn 
only €130 per week before their OPFP payment begins to be withdrawn. Budget 
2012 originally announced that the earnings disregard would fall on a phased basis, 
over a five-year period, from €146.50 to €60 per week.16 This would have brought 
it in line with the disregard in place for those on Jobseeker’s Allowance. Given the 
finding by Bargain et al. (2014) that Irish single mothers have a highly elastic labour 
supply, there is certainly an economic rationale for having a higher earnings 
disregard under the OPFP.  
Overall, the changes in the social welfare entitlement of lone parents from 2011 
have aimed at reducing the incidence of unconditional payments and encouraging 
labour market participation through activation policies. Bonoli (2010) classifies 
labour market activation policies into four types: incentive reinforcement, 
employment assistance, occupation, and human capital investment.17 He notes 
that English-speaking countries commonly combine incentive reinforcement 
policies with employment assistance philosophies. The new Irish policy developed 
for lone parents would fit this profile. Incentive reinforcement policies aim at 
strengthening work incentives for people in receipt of welfare whereas 
employment assistance consists of a broad set of measures aimed at removing 
barriers to labour market participation such as job search programmes and 
placement services. The availability of in-work benefits, time limits on 
unconditional payments of OPFP and sanctions in the form of reduced JST for 
failure to engage in case officer meetings would be typical of incentive 
reinforcement strategies. The activation element under JST is aimed at facilitating 
lone parents back to work by providing counselling for career options from a DEASP 
case officer.  
Given time lags in data for analysis – the final change to OPFP was only 
 
                                                          
 
16  The earnings disregard did fall to €90 a week in 2014 before being increased to €130 in 2018. This drop to €90 will not 
be picked up in our analysis as we focus on the income and work incentives of lone parents under the current (2018) 
rules (i.e. an earnings disregard of €130) as compared to the rules in place in 2011 (i.e. a disregard of €146.50). 
17  For a full discussion of all four measures see Bonoli (2010). 
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implemented in July 2015 – and the fact that it is likely to take time for activation 
policies, particularly education and upskilling based approaches, to affect 
employment prospects and wages, it is too early to say if the OPFP policy changes 
have had the desired effect. Further work investigating how these policies affect 
employment prospects and human capital formation can be conducted as more 
timely data become available.18  
3 METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Distributional analysis 
As discussed in the introduction, in order to isolate the impact of changes in OPFP 
policy on the income and work incentives of lone parents, it is necessary to 
examine an appropriate counterfactual, i.e. what would have happened in the 
absence of the policy changes. We do this using microsimulation techniques which 
allow us to isolate these policy change impacts.  
SWITCH, the ESRI’s microsimulation model, provides an extremely useful platform 
of analysis for isolating the impact of tax-benefit policy changes on the incomes of 
the lone-parent population. The model is based on pooled 2013 and 2014 data 
from the CSO’s Survey of Income and Living Conditions and the data are adjusted 
to be representative of the current 2018 population.19 We will compare the 
cumulative change of policy impacts from 2011 to 2018 by analysing how the 
current lone-parent population would fare if they were to face the 2011 set of 
budget policies as opposed to the policy in place at present. In doing so we will also 
estimate the distributional impact of all budgetary tax-benefit changes over the 
time frame on lone-parent income alongside analysing the impact solely of changes 
in the OPFP, as different policies may have countervailing effects.  
The model effectively allows us to ask ‘what if’ the changes to the OPFP had not 
occurred. In practice this reverses the changes in OPFP eligibility so that the current 
set of lone parents – some of whom are receiving OPFP as they have a child under 
7, some of whom are in receipt of JST as they have a child in the 7–13 age band, 
and others who are in receipt of other benefits such as JSA or WFP – are assessed 
under the old OPFP scheme. 
In order to arrive at a satisfactory counterfactual, i.e. what would have happened 
to the OPFP rates in the absence of policy changes, we provide results under a 
number of options. We firstly consider results assuming the 2011 OPFP rates were 
increased in line with 2011–2018 wage growth of 8 per cent20 (known as wage 
 
                                                          
 
18  Indeed, the official evaluation of the scheme changes carried out by Indecon (2017) concludes that as the number of 
years since the final changes occurred is low, more analysis will be needed in the future. 
19  The pooled SILC 2013 and 2014 data contain 714 lone parents, of whom 404 receive OPFP. 
20  Wage growth from 2011 to 2017 comes from the Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs Survey (EHECS), standing at 
5 per cent, coupled with predicted 2018 wage growth of 3 per cent coming from an average of predictions in the 
Winter 2017 Quarterly Economic Commentary and the Central Bank Q4 report.  
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indexation). This wage-indexed policy increases the 2011 tax credits, tax bands and 
social welfare rates by 8 per cent to allow for a distributionally neutral benchmark 
of assessment as income growth is similar at all income levels, while being 
macroeconomically neutral as average tax rates are constant. Given that increasing 
social welfare rates and tax credits/bands in line with wage growth can be costly 
to the Exchequer, particularly in times of high wage growth, we examine a second 
indexation option. This second scenario bears in mind that the 2011–2018 period 
was one where the macroeconomic situation was still coming out of recession and 
fiscal space available to government over this time period was tight. We therefore 
also consider results increasing (or indexing) 2011 OPFP rates in line with the 
average increase in personal rates and Increases for Qualified Children/Adults 
(IQCs, IQAs) of all other social welfare payments (Child Benefit, Jobseeker’s 
Allowance, Jobseeker’s Benefit, etc.) from 2011 to 2018. The resultant indexation 
rate is 4 per cent.  
We may ask what is the ‘best’ scenario to use. There is no ‘correct’ answer to this 
question – obviously governments face financial constraints when deciding how 
much to increase social welfare rates by in a Budget. It is, however, important to 
bear in mind that income poverty is a relative measure so that a failure to index 
benefits in line with wage growth will ultimately result in benefit recipients’ 
incomes growing at a slower rate than those of people in employment.21 This will 
tend to increase inequality and poverty rates, both relative measures. It will also 
result in ‘bracket creep’ whereby workers face an increase in tax liability as tax 
bands and credits fail to rise in line with incomes. For a full review of indexation 
see Callan et al. (2015).  
3.2 Measuring the financial incentive to work 
We also make use of microsimulation techniques to isolate the impact of policy 
reforms on the financial incentives of lone parents to be in employment. We 
calculate replacement rate (RR), which measures an individual’s out-of-work 
income as a percentage of their in-work income and is defined as: 
𝑅𝑅 = 100 ∗ 
𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘
𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘
 
For example, an individual with out-of-work disposable income of €250 and 
disposable income when participating in employment of €500 would have an RR of 
50 per cent. A higher RR indicates a weaker financial incentive to work, while a 
lower RR indicates a stronger incentive. 
Obviously, we only observe out-of-work income for those not in employment and 
in-work income for those in employment. We therefore use SWITCH to calculate 
out-of-work income for those currently in employment (i.e. what they would 
 
                                                          
 
21  Price inflation will also reduce the purchasing power of those on fixed income, such as benefit recipients. 
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receive in benefits if they were no longer working), and for those not currently in 
employment we estimate how much they would earn if they did work.22 SWITCH 
is then used to calculate disposable in-work income. 
4 RESULTS 
4.1 Lone-parent income changes 
A priori, we are unsure how changes to OPFP eligibility will affect the income of 
lone parents. Some lone parents remain eligible for OPFP as they have a child under 
7. Others with children in the 7–13 age group are eligible for JST while the 
remainder receive payments under other schemes such as the WFP. In addition, 
the payment rates for the OPFP have risen while the income disregard has fallen.  
In Table 3 we estimate that for the 2018 population of lone parents, approximately 
90,000 would be eligible for OPFP if they faced the eligibility rules for the scheme 
as they were in 2011. Of this group, 53 per cent remain eligible for OPFP and a 
further 27 per cent avail of JST. In total, 80 per cent of those eligible for OPFP who 
would have been eligible for OPFP under the 2011 rules are now eligible for either 
OPFP or JST. The remainder are eligible for the WFP or other schemes. 
 
TABLE 3 SCHEMES FOR LONE PARENTS ELIGIBLE FOR 2011 OPFP, 2018 
2018 Scheme % 
One-Parent Family Payment (OPFP) 53 
Jobseeker Transition Scheme (JST) 27 
Working Family Payment (WFP) 12 
Other schemes 8 
Total (N) 89,423 
  
Source: Authors’ own calculations using SWITCH. 
 
We begin by examining the average change in income for lone parents as a result 
of all tax-benefit changes that occurred in 2011 to 2018 under the two different 
counterfactual scenarios (indexation in line with other social welfare rates; 
indexation in line with wage growth).  
Table 4 shows the average percentage change in income of lone parents as a result 
of all tax-benefit policy changes from 2011 to 2018. Overall we see that these policy 
changes put in place over the time period analysed reduced lone-parent incomes 
 
                                                          
 
22  We run an ordinary least squares regression of age, gender and educational qualifications (and their interactions) for 
earners and use the coefficients to predict hourly wages for non-earners. A random error term is also added. We reduce 
our estimates of predicted earnings for those returning to employment from a spell of unemployment by 10 per cent 
to acknowledge the wage-scarring effect of unemployment. We then assume a 40-hour work week to arrive at weekly 
in-work income. Further details on estimation of potential wages can be found in Callan et al. (2016).  
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and 3.7 per cent with indexation in line with wage growth). 
Table 4 also separates lone parents by labour force status and shows the average 
change in income across employed and non-employed lone parents. With lower 
indexation by social welfare growth, both employed and unemployed lone parents 
lost around 1.4 per cent of income between 2011 and 2018. Wage indexation 
amplifies this effect, with the employed and non-employed experiencing income 
losses of 3.4 and 4.8 per cent respectively.  
 
TABLE 4 PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN LONE-PARENT DISPOSABLE INCOME, 2011 BUDGETS VS 
2018, ALL BUDGETARY CHANGES 
  2011, indexation by SW rates (%) 2011, indexation by wage (%)growth 
Employed lone parents −1.4 −3.4 
Non-employed lone parents −1.5 −4.8 
All lone parents −1.4 −3.7 
   
Source: Authors’ own calculations using SWITCH. 
 
These results capture the total impact of all tax-benefit changes such as the 
changes to OPFP scheme but also changes in income tax bands, tax credits, child 
benefit, etc. In Table 5 we decompose income changes for employed and non-
employed lone parents into those due to the changes in OPFP and those due to all 
other tax-benefit budgetary measures.  
Overall, the OPFP scheme changes held constant, or even slightly increased, the 
incomes of non-employed lone parents (i.e. zero change under the wage 
indexation scenario, +1.8 per cent under the social welfare indexation scenario) 
but other tax-benefit policies served to reduce them (by 3.3–4.8 per cent 
depending on the indexation scenario chosen). Meanwhile, for employed lone 
parents changes to the OPFP decreased their income (by 1.3–1.9 per cent), with 
other tax-benefit changes serving to reduce them further (−0.01/−1.5 per cent). 
Results of gains in the income of non-employed lone parents and losses for 
employed lone parents may appear to go against the original aim of increasing 
lone-parent employment but are not surprising, given the fact that the personal 
rates and IQCs increased in nominal terms between 2011 and 2018 but the 
earnings disregard fell.  
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TABLE 5 DECOMPOSITION OF PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN LONE-PARENT INCOME, 2011 
BUDGETS VS 2018 
    
2011, indexation by SW 
rates 
2011, indexation by wage 
growth 
    % % 
Employed lone parent 
OPFP effect −1.3 −1.9 
Other 
policies 
−0.01 −1.5 
Total change −1.4 −3.4 
Non-employed lone 
parent 
OPFP effect 1.8 0 
Other 
policies 
−3.3 −4.8 
Total change −1.5 −4.8 
Source: Authors’ analysis using SWITCH. 
 
4.2 Impact on financial work incentives 
4.2.1 High replacement rate levels 
To shed light on how the income changes summarised in the previous section have 
affected work incentives, we will next analyse the current financial incentives (as 
measured by the RR) for lone parents to be in paid work and how they were 
affected by changes to the OPFP. It is worth bearing in mind that RR analysis 
captures the current or short-term financial incentives to work and other 
considerations will come into play. 
Firstly, non-cash benefits and their loss may also play a role, such as the potential 
loss of a medical card upon returning to employment.23 Secondly, even if the 
financial incentives to work for the unemployed are favourable, individuals may 
find it difficult to find employment due to labour market circumstances. This may 
have particularly been the case in recent years in Ireland due to high 
unemployment rates and weak labour demand. Thirdly, other considerations may 
come into play for those facing high financial disincentives to work. Research by 
Callan et al. (2012) found that of those financially better off not working (i.e. with 
RRs in excess of 100 per cent), once work costs such as travel and childcare were 
taken into account, nearly three-quarters were actually in employment. Individuals 
may derive personal satisfaction from being in employment, or may want to 
remain in the workforce to protect their future earnings, which could be damaged 
by a spell of unemployment. This may particularly be relevant for those with 
children – there may be a time period during which childcare costs may be high 
(for example while their children are of preschool age) and financial incentives to 
work low, but a parent may choose to stay in employment over these years to 
protect their career and future earnings.  
 
                                                          
 
23  In consideration of this, those in longer-term receipt of OPFP (12 months or more) are allowed to retain their medical 
card upon a return to employment for a period of 3 years. 
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In addition, non-financial work incentives are likely to have increased due to the 
changes made to OPFP, for example by strengthening activation requirements 
once a lone parent’s youngest child is past the age of seven through access to 
activation supports. As mentioned in Section 1, further analysis will be needed in 
the future to examine the impact of activation supports on lone-parent 
engagement in education and employment. 
The current distribution of RRs will be compared against counterfactual RRs if 
current lone parents faced the 2011 OPFP scheme and its eligibility requirements. 
As before, we consider two counterfactual scenarios: 
• 2011 OPFP scheme, with monetary amounts indexed by social welfare growth 
(4 per cent); 
• 2011 OPFP scheme, with monetary amounts indexed by wage growth (8 per 
cent). 
As it is high RRs that determine if an individual faces a low financial incentive to 
work, our results focus on the number of lone parents who face high replacement 
rates. We deem this group to be those who would have at least 70 per cent of their 
in-work income replaced by out-of-work income.  
Table 6 highlights the incidence of these high RRs among lone parents across the 
two counterfactual scenarios. In 2018, 20.9 per cent of lone parents face an RR of 
over 70 per cent. If the current population of lone parents were to face the 2011 
OPFP scheme, there would be a modest drop in the numbers facing RRs greater 
than 70 per cent to just over 18 per cent. 
 
TABLE 6 INCIDENCE (%) OF HIGH REPLACEMENT RATE AMONG LONE PARENTS – ACTUAL AND 
HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIOS 
Replacement rate category 2018, Actual 
2011 OPFP,  
indexation  
by SW rates 
2011 OPFP,  
indexation 
 by wage growth 
>70 20.9 18.2 18.5 
>80 10.6 9.6 9.9 
>90 5.0 3.1 4.3 
>100 2.4 1.0 1.2 
Number of cases with RR > 70% 35,087 30,504 30,948 
Source: Authors’ analysis using SWITCH. 
 
These initial aggregate results for all lone parents indicate that the cumulative 
changes to lone-parent policy led to a small increase in the incidence of low work 
incentives among lone parents. The lone-parent group itself is a diverse one and 
will contain lone parents in and out of work, lone parents whose sole income 
source is from benefits, and others who receive no means-tested benefits at all. 
Some continue to be eligible for the OPFP while others are eligible for the JST. We 
therefore repeat these results in Tables 7 and 8, breaking down lone parents into 
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two subgroups by receipt of the two main benefits – Table 7 showing the results 
for lone parents in 2018 receiving the OPFP and Table 8 showing the results for 
lone parents receiving JST.24  
 
Table 7 shows the occurrence of high RRs for lone parents in receipt of OPFP in 
2018. These are lone parents whose youngest child is under seven years of age and 
whose means are below the limit for the OPFP. For this cohort, 26 per cent have 
an RR greater than 70 per cent in 2018, slightly higher than the 24 to 25 per cent 
that would be the case under the 2011 OPFP rules.  
 
TABLE 7 INCIDENCE (%) OF HIGH REPLACEMENT RATES FOR THOSE IN IN RECEIPT OF OPFP IN 
2018 
Replacement Rate Category 2018, Actual 2011 OPFP, indexation  by SW rates 
2011 OPFP, indexation 
 by wage growth 
>70 26.0 24.2 25.0 
>80 13.0 12.0 11.3 
>90 4.1 3.9 4.3 
>100 1.0 0.6 1.0 
Number of cases with RR > 70% 11,671 10,855 11,185 
    
Source: Authors’ analysis using SWITCH. 
 
 
The results indicate a small increase in the incidence of high RRs for those currently 
eligible for OPFP. This outcome is driven by two effects. Firstly, the increase in 
unconditional payments, i.e. the increase in the personal rate of OPFP from €188 
to €198, the reintroduction of a Christmas bonus,25 and an increase in IQCs26 from 
€29.80 to €31.80 led to higher out-of-work income for lone parents. Secondly, the 
decrease in the earnings disregard for OPFP recipients (from €146.50 in 2011 to 
€130 in 2018) led to a relative decrease in in-work income as the OPFP payment is 
now tapered away at an earlier stage. 
Figure 2 demonstrates this relationship, showing the amount of OPFP/JST a lone 
parent earning €10 an hour would receive if they were to work between 0 and 40 
hours per week. There is a higher income from OPFP/JST in 2018 when a lone 
parent is unemployed (i.e. at zero hours of work in the graph) due to the increase 
in the personal rate, IQC and Christmas bonus. Under the 2011 OPFP scheme the 
benefit was not tapered away until the lone parent was working nearly 15 hours, 
while under the 2018 OPFP/JST rules the benefit begins to be withdrawn at 13 
hours of work. At 40 hours of work per week the effect of a lower earnings 
 
                                                          
 
24  Small sample sizes prohibit us from examining the replacement rates of lone parents on other schemes such as WFP. 
25  At 85 per cent of the weekly payment rate. 
26  Note that the OPFP IQC increased by 7 per cent while the personal rate increased by 5 per cent. As the full IQC amount 
will be received by those out of work but generally not by those in work (as it is means tested away), this sharper 
increase will also contribute to a rise in replacement rates. 
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disregard means that the 2018 OPFP payment lies just marginally above the 2011 
OPFP payment. While the payment for working 40 hours increased only marginally, 
the payment at 0 hours worked increased more sharply, resulting in increased RRs.  
FIGURE 2 WEEKLY PAYMENT OF JST/OPFP AT VARIOUS HOURS WORKED, JST/OPFP 2018 VS OPFP 2011 
 
Source:  Authors’ analysis using SWITCH. 
Notes:  Lone parent is assumed to earn €10 in gross wages per hour and has one child, aged 6 for OPFP and 9 for JST. 
 
Table 8 examines the occurrence of high RRs among lone parents in receipt of JST 
in 2018, i.e. those whose youngest child is aged 7 to 13 and whose means are below 
the JST limit. Again, we compare the current levels of high RRs with those that 
would have occurred if the 2011 OPFP scheme had remained under our two 
alternative counterfactuals. Two points are of interest – firstly, this group of lone 
parents with children in the 7–13 age range face substantially higher RRs than their 
OPFP-receiving counterparts, with nearly half (49.4 per cent) having a current RR 
in excess of 70 per cent. Secondly, there is a much sharper increase in the 
frequency of high replacement rates in 2018 among these lone parents compared 
to the 42 to 44 per cent that would have be in place if the 2011 OPFP rules still 
applied.  
TABLE 8 INCIDENCE (%) OF HIGH REPLACEMENT RATES FOR THOSE IN IN RECEIPT OF JST IN 
2018 
Replacement rate 
category 
2018, Actual 
2011 OPFP, 
indexation by SW 
rates 
2011 OPFP, indexation 
 by wage growth 
>70 49.4 42.5 44.1 
>80 21.8 21.4 21.7 
>90 11.3 5.3 9.9 
>100 3.1 2.3 3 
Number of cases 
with RR > 70% 
13,235 11,382 11,817 
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Source: Authors’ analysis using SWITCH. 
 
In all the scenarios examined in Table 8, lone parents in receipt of JST have 
substantially higher RRs than was observed in  
Table 7 for lone parents in receipt of OPFP. As JST has the same payment rates and 
income disregards as OPFP, these differences cannot be due to differences in these 
monetary parameters. Instead, these results can be explained by the employment 
patterns of the employed lone parents in receipt of JST. This group typically work 
lower hours than lone parents in receipt of OPFP, with 42 per cent of lone parents 
in receipt of JST working more than 20 hours per week, as compared to 59 per cent 
for OPFP recipients (see Table 9). 
This leads to lower observed in-work income for these employed lone parents. 
There is no clear reason for these differences as there are no marked differences 
between the two cohorts in terms of educational attainment, number of children 
or earnings potential, and further analysis outside the scope of this paper would 
be needed to examine what is driving such differences.  
 
TABLE 9 HOURS WORKED BY LONE PARENTS 2018 
Hours worked per week In receipt of JST 2018 (%) 
In receipt of OPFP 2018 
(%) 
0 26 32 
1 to 10 6 1 
10 to 20 26 8 
≥20 42 59 
Source: Authors’ analysis using SWITCH. 
Notes:   Excludes lone parents in education. 
4.2.2 Incorporating childcare costs 
A standard examination of financial incentives to work does not usually take 
account of costs of work; rather the focus is on post-transfer, post-tax/USC/PRSI 
income. Results presented in the preceding section therefore looked purely at a 
comparison of in-work and out-of-work income without taking account of any 
work-related costs. Childcare costs, as discussed earlier, are a particularly 
prominent issue among lone parents given the high level of such costs in Ireland 
and the fact that a lone parent occupies the role of primary care giver and sole 
income earner. Therefore, for lone parents, third-party childcare tends to go hand 
in hand with full-time employment.  
In considering the impact childcare costs have on work incentives, it is also 
important to incorporate subsidies available for childcare costs which aim at 
making childcare more affordable. The childcare subsidy landscape has changed 
with the introduction of the Affordable Childcare Scheme (ACS), replacing previous 
childcare subsidy schemes and expanding coverage. ACS subsidies are aimed at 
children aged between 6 months and 15 years. ACS subsidises hourly childcare 
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used based on a means test, parental labour force status and child age. This 
harmonised scheme27 that was partially rolled out28 in 2017 complements the Early 
Childcare and Education (ECCE) scheme, in place since 2010, which offers 15 hours’ 
free childcare per week for pre-school children between 3 and 5.5 years old. We 
therefore incorporate childcare costs into our calculation of the current RRs of lone 
parents and demonstrate how childcare costs may also affect the financial 
incentive to work. We then take account of childcare subsidies and examine how 
they affect lone-parent work incentives.  
To include childcare cost in the calculation of RRs we require information on 
childcare costs for a lone parent’s current situation (be they non-employed or 
employed), and need to estimate counterfactual childcare costs when their labour 
force status changes. For in-work childcare costs we use reported childcare costs 
(as reported in the SILC survey) for lone parents we currently observe in work. For 
unemployed lone parents we estimate childcare costs for a 40-hour work week. To 
do so we assume that these lone parents utilise crèche services.29 We use the 
2016/2017 national average childcare costs as reported by Pobal (2017) as the 
counterfactual childcare costs for these lone parents. We assume a child less than 
5 years old must avail of full-time childcare (€174 per week). For older children in 
education aged between 5 and 12 we use part-time childcare (€99) and for children 
older than 12 we assume no childcare costs. When calculating in-work income we 
then also calculate entitlement to ACS and ECCE and deduct the subsidy from 
childcare costs. We assume zero childcare costs in the out-of-work situation when 
an employed lone parent is ‘made’ unemployed in the model.  
Table 10 shows in column 2 the incidence of high RRs in 2018 for lone parents 
excluding childcare costs (as shown above in  
Table 6). In column 3 gross childcare costs are taken into account, while in column 
4 childcare costs net of subsidy entitlement are taken into account. The 
introduction of childcare costs increases the incidence of high RRs, with 31 per cent 
of lone parents facing an RR greater than 70 per cent as compared to nearly 21 per 
cent when childcare costs are excluded. 
Introducing subsidies for childcare usage mediates slightly the incidence of high 
RRs, with close to 30 per cent of lone parents facing an RR greater than 70 per cent. 
Childcare costs also seem to induce a spike in RRs over 100 per cent, where being 
out of work would be a more financially attractive position than working. RRs in 
this range increase from 2.4 per cent excluding childcare costs and subsidies to 
15.7 per cent with childcare costs. This large increase highlights that large childcare 
 
                                                          
 
27  For a full summary of the scheme, see 
https://www.dcya.gov.ie/documents/legislation/20170126ACSHeadsOfBillandGenScheme.pdf 
28  Technical and administrative difficulties have delayed full rollout of the ACS. 
29  While a substantial number of individuals use free childcare (e.g. by grandparents), it is important to factor in 
childcare costs, as not everyone will have this option available to them. Indeed, those who do may be in employment 
precisely because of this, while those out of work may be so due to a lack of available (free) childcare.  
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costs are a barrier to participation in the labour market for lone parents. Subsidies 
seem to have the greatest impact on tempering the rise in very high RRs, with the 
portion of lone parents facing RRs greater than 120 per cent almost halving, 
decreasing from 11.4 per cent with childcare costs to 6.5 per cent once subsidies 
are factored in. This highlights that the subsidies should make work more 
financially attractive for the lone parents for whom their out-of-work income 
would have exceeded their in-work income. Through this mechanism such 
subsidies are likely to encourage increased labour force participation among lone 
parents in the future.  
 
TABLE 10 INCIDENCE (%) OF HIGH RATES 2018, WITH AND WITHOUT CHILDCARE COSTS 
Replacement 
rate category 
2018,  
Excl. childcare costs and 
subsidies 
2018,  
With childcare costs, no 
subsidies 
2018,  
With childcare costs and 
subsidies 
>70 20.9 31.0 29.5 
>80 10.6 23.4 20.2 
>90 5.0 17.3 15.5 
>100 2.4 15.7 13.3 
>120 0.9 11.4 6.5 
Source: Authors’ analysis using SWITCH. 
 
Even accounting for subsidies, childcare costs have a non-trivial effect on the 
incentives to be in paid work for lone parents. Initially 20.9 per cent of lone parents 
experienced an RR over 70 per cent, rising to close to 30 per cent when net 
childcare costs are considered. Andrén (2003) suggests that a decrease in childcare 
cost increases the labour supply of those already working rather than encouraging 
those out of work to enter employment. As such it is important to consider that 
the subsidies may benefit working parents as opposed to increasing the likelihood 
of being employed for unemployed parents. Future work in this area will be carried 
out as part of the ESRI’s Tax, Welfare and Pensions research programme. 
5 CONCLUSION 
This paper set out to examine the impact of changes to the OPFP on the incomes 
of lone parents and the work incentives they face. It examined how the incomes of 
the current set of lone parents would have looked if eligibility for the scheme had 
remained unchanged from 2011, in order to isolate the effect of tax-benefit policy 
changes between 2011 and 2018. Against a distributionally neutral counterfactual 
of indexation in line with wage growth, it found a 3.7 per cent reduction in 
disposable income for lone parents attributable to all tax-benefit policy changes 
that occurred between 2011 and 2018. Non-employed lone parents experienced 
slightly larger losses than their employed counterparts. Isolating the impact of the 
changes in the OPFP benefit alone, and focusing on the wage indexation 
counterfactual, employed lone parents saw a 1.9 per cent reduction in income due 
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to the OPFP changes while there was no effect on the incomes of non-employed 
lone parents.  
The paper also examined the work incentives faced by lone parents and how these 
were affected by changes to the OPFP. The results show that changes to the OPFP 
led to a decline in financial work incentives faced by lone parents. These results are 
driven by two effects. Firstly, the increase in payment rates of OPFP (for example 
the personal rate and IQC) led to higher out-of-work income for lone parents. 
Secondly, the decrease in the earnings disregard for OPFP recipients led to a 
relative decrease in in-work income as the OPFP payment is now tapered away at 
an earlier stage.  
The paper points to the importance of assistance with childcare costs for lone 
parents to facilitate their return to employment. An examination of work 
incentives that take account of childcare costs for the current population of lone 
parents demonstrates the positive impact that recently introduced childcare 
subsidies will have, but also highlights the non-negligible effect that childcare costs 
net of subsidies will continue to have on the work incentives of lone parents. 
The focus of this paper was to isolate the impact of changes in the OPFP payments 
on incomes and work incentives. In doing so, it does not take account of the fact 
that a focus on activation measures is likely to increase the attachment of lone 
parents to the labour market. Given that the OPFP changes were finalised only in 
2015, it is as yet too soon to say whether the changes will result in increased 
employment rates of lone parents. Initial evidence by Indecon (2017) points to 
some positive impacts on engagement in work, but future analysis will be needed 
to evaluate the longer-term effect of the changes.  
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